

Approved For Release 2004/09/23 : CIA-RDP80M01133A000100280009-9

Committee
-9 12(b)

SECOM-M-175
20 May 1975

One Hundred Seventy-Fifth Meeting
Tuesday, 20 May 1975, 1000 to 1200 Hours
Room 6E-0708, CIA Headquarters

25X1

Chairman
Presiding

MEMBERS PRESENT

25X1

ALTERNATES PRESENT

25X1

25X1

ALSO PRESENT

from attachments

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DATE OF DECLASSIFICATION

100-280009-*A determine*
(unless impossible, insert date or event)

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20 May 1975Preliminary Remarks

25X1 The Chairman informed members that on 9 May 1975, he and [] Director of Security CIA, visited with Mr. Carl H. Simms, Director of Security of the House Select Committee to view the space to be utilized by the Committee staff until 1 July 1975 and the space contemplated to be the permanent space thereafter. The Committee now has three rooms in the Cannon Office Building. These will be used until 1 July 1975. While they are not suitable for good security control practices, it is believed that the Committee will be in the organizational stage until 1 July 1975 and there will be no need for storage of the more sensitive material until after a move to contiguous space in the Rayburn Office Building. The CIA member informed that he thought the space in the Rayburn Building will be appropriate and has offered to do a physical security survey at the time compartmented materials may be called for. The DIA member mentioned that Mr. Simms had requested, and DIA had provided, support in the establishment of a document control for classified but non-codeword material as well as other security procedures.

The Chairman repeated his previous statement that Mr. Simms gave every impression of being most security conscious and to be trying to make appropriate arrangements for the proper security of documents furnished the House Select Committee. [] 25X1 agreed and mentioned that he could see only one potential problem after the move to the proposed new space. The problem concerns movement of classified material to the hearing room. Appropriate consideration will be given to this problem.

The Chairman mentioned that no clearances had been provided us by the House Select Committee for any staff officer or employee of the staff, including Mr. Simms. It is anticipated that clearance procedures for the House will be similar to those established with the Senate Select Committee.

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In connection with clearances for personnel of the Senate Select Committee, the Chairman mentioned that there were 76 staff personnel cleared for access to TOP SECRET material. Of these, 33 had been approved and briefed for access to Category III COMINT, TK [] Of the 33, 8 have been provided briefings on some specific projects.

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Attached for members' information is a current listing of cleared personnel of the Senate Select Committee and indications of those personnel briefed for access to compartmented materials.

The NSA member mentioned that some difficulty had arisen in trying to verify compartmented clearances accredited to Senate Select Committee staff personnel. The CIA member said that he would attempt to make the certification process a more timely procedure. [] further mentioned the probable cause of delay as being related to the manual procedure by which names and clearances are put into the computer. The updating is done overnight and names received on one day will not be put on the computer and be ready to use in the certification process until the next day.

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1. Approval of Minutes

Based upon comments made by members, the Chairman directed that amended pages to the minutes of the 29 April 1975 meeting be prepared. The amended pages 1 and 7 to SECOM-M-174 2 May 1975 are attached.

2. Report of Chairmen of Subcommittees

(a) TSCS - [] Chairman, informed that the TSCS had approved the Threat Assessment Program in principle and was now soliciting funds and volunteers to serve as executive agent. [] mentioned that one agency may have some end-of-the-year funds available and the Department of State might also be able to commit funds. Two agencies have indicated a willingness to serve as executive agent.

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25X1 [] also mentioned that the TSCS R&D Working Group was considering its future role and how it might best be organized to properly discharge the expectations as well as the specific charges levied upon it. A report may be available for the Security Committee within a month.

(b) Compartmentation Subcommittee - [] Chairman, 25X1 informed that this Subcommittee had recently completed deliberations on DCID 1/7 and hopefully would soon have comments or concurrences by departments or agencies which have participated in the revision exercise. Shortly thereafter, a revision will be provided to the Security Committee with the recommendations that it be adopted.

(c) USIB Declassification Guidelines - In the absence of the Chairman of this Working Group, [] informed the members 25X1 that Mr. Gambino had received certain recommendations for changes from the ICRC through the DoD member who had proposed additional changes. The changes were not considered to be major issues. Mr. Gambino and the DIA representative met with the DoD member of the ICRC; some changes were accepted and incorporated, other proposals were withdrawn.

25X1 [] commented that he and Mr. Gambino hoped to 25X1 meet with [] of the ICRC in the near future toward a goal of moving forward on promulgating these guidelines.

3. Discussion of DCID 1/14

25X1 The Chairman acknowledged receipt of the comments and 25X1 proposed changes to DCID 1/14 which had been prepared and forwarded to members by NSA under a cover memorandum dated 13 May 1975 from [] NSA member.

[] mentioned that at the 29 April 75' meeting of the Security Committee the members had reviewed, line by line, the draft prepared and recommended by the Compartmentation Subcommittee (SECOM/CS-02-75, 10 April 1975). During the course of that review various proposals were made and considered for changes. Following

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the review, members had accepted the Subcommittee's version as modified with the exception of NSA. [] asked if any member had reconsidered his position and wished to withdraw concurrence. No member changed his position.

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[] then asked the members to discuss any further changes they may have.

[] requested reconsideration of an Air Force proposal to change Page 5, para d to use the phrase: "permissible by law" in lieu of the phrase, "where feasible". It was mentioned that this proposal had been considered at the 29 April meeting and had been rejected by members. No member agreed to adopt the proposed Air Force change.

[] NSA, then addressed the changes proposed by NSA and set forth in the attachment to his 13 May 1975 memorandum to Chairman, Security Committee. [] said that the majority of the proposed changes were offered in order to recast the DCID 1/14 revision in a more positive tone. He was prepared to waive most of his suggested changes if the members so desired. There were two changes he considered significant and worthy of attention of members.

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The first was a proposal to modify the language so as to preclude exception authority to waive the requirement that candidates for access to sensitive intelligence "shall be stable, of excellent character and discretion and of unquestioned loyalty to the United States."

The Chairman and members agreed and the proposed modification was accepted.

The second major point proposed for consideration by NSA concerns a recommendation to modify the DCID 1/14 so as to permit tailoring reinvestigation programs commensurate with the degree of access to sensitive compartmented information (SCI). This proposal would recognize a difference between recipients

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of SCI solely through periodic access and individuals with detailed knowledge of unusually sensitive collection, processing and production procedures and would require greater reinvestigative efforts for the latter.

Following a detailed discussion of this proposal, the consensus of opinion of the members was that it should not be adopted.

The Chairman then accepted the consensus of the membership to adopt the Subcommittee version of DCID 1/14 as amended by agreement. NSA's nonconcurrence was noted and their comments were requested by the Chairman in a form that could be forwarded to the Board.

The CIA member noted that his concurrence was based on the understanding that this version of the DCID 1/14 was a statement of minimum standards or criteria for access to SCI and that it would not preclude additional actions by members.

The Chairman expressed appreciation to the Subcommittee and its Working Group for the hard work and long hours spent on this task.

4. New Business

(a) The Chairman alerted members to a possible task for Security Committee attention growing out of a request by the Director of Naval Intelligence to the DCI for consideration of a proposed security policy on liaison relationships with foreign countries. Attached for information of members is a copy of Admiral Inman's memorandum and proposed policy statement (Memorandum for DCI from Admiral Inman, dated 12 May 1975 Subject: Security policy guidance on liaison relationships with foreign countries. Ser 009C/C75684, Confidential)

(b) The Chairman mentioned to the members that mention was made at the 9 May 1975 Board meeting that the Security Committee was reviewing all aspects of compartmentation. [] said that there were a few small activities related to compartmentation of current attention but that he did not believe these were the points of issue at the Board meeting. He hoped to be able to obtain a definition of the Board's concern in this area.

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25X1 (c) [] mentioned that coordination with COMIREX and SIGINT Committee had been completed on proposed duty and travel restrictions for Cambodia, Laos, and South Vietnam. These will be distributed through compartmented channels by [] as Chief, Special Security Center. A copy is attached for information of members. (SECOM-D-65, 20 May 1975 Confidential)

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5. Next Meeting

The Chairman proposed and members agreed to schedule the next meeting for 10 June 1975 1000 hours, Room 6E-0708, CIA Headquarters at which time DCID 1/7 would be addressed if required concurrences or comments have been received.

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[]
Executive Secretary

Attachments

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